Service by Mail—Is the Stamp of Approval From the Hague Convention Always Enough? by Weis, Joseph F., Jr.
SERVICE BY MAIL-IS THE STAMP OF
APPROVAL FROM THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ALWAYS ENOUGH?
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH F. WEIS, JR.*
I
INTRODUCTION
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1963, the
drafters hoped that their example would encourage foreign states to be
receptive to a new convention that would ease restrictions on service of process
in transnational litigation. Philip Amram, one of the United States's leading
lawyers in the international law field, announced that the rules and legislative
changes did not depend on reciprocity.) But certainly there was an underlying
anticipation that the United States's example would be followed by other
nations agreeing to allow more flexibility in service of process. To some extent,
that goal was achieved.
The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters' succeeded in providing a
framework that substantially improved the means of serving process in
transnational litigation. "The Europeans obtained a more formal method for
serving process in the United States and the Americans gained assurances that
service on U.S. defendants would be reasonably calculated to give them actual
notice."3 Although the Hague Convention relaxed the rules for international
service of process, many restrictions still apply and the means provided for
service are not as simple as those applicable in U.S. domestic cases.
Generally, it seems that U.S. lawyers, particularly those active in the
products liability field, are less than enthusiastic about the Hague Convention.
Those familiar with the treaty chafe at what they consider time-consuming and
unnecessarily complex steps required to accomplish what is routine in domestic
litigation. In the absence of energetic judicial direction, the bar has attempted
to avoid the Convention's procedures and, instead, use the more familiar
domestic methods.
It may be concluded that this evasion is caused by a lack of familiarity with
the Convention's requirements. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
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of Civil Procedure has attempted to remedy this problem by calling the
attention of the bar to the Convention. However, in a recent proposal for
amendments to the Rules, the Committee itself drafted an informal waiver
procedure that would have bypassed the Convention in a significant number of
cases.
4
The proposed Rule 4(d) would have permitted a plaintiff to send a copy of
a complaint that had been filed in a federal court, accompanied by a request
that the defendant execute an enclosed waiver of formal service.5  The
complaint and waiver form were to be sent by first class mail. Failure to accede
to a waiver could have subjected that party to the costs of effecting service in
the usual fashion. This suggested rule would have had the advantage of
eliminating nonproductive expense and endorsing the practice of using the mails
to serve process and give notice of a lawsuit.
The proposal of this new rule, however, aroused opposition by some
signatories as well as nonparties to the Hague Convention.6 The adverse
comments were generally directed at the provision that permitted the imposition
of costs in securing service if the request for waiver were not accepted. To meet
these concerns, the Standing Committee and the Judicial Conference changed
the proposal by making the cost assessment applicable only if both the plaintiff
and defendant were "located within the United States." The new Rule was
adopted in this form. As a result, a refusal to waive service of process will have
no adverse consequences for a foreign defendant.7 Despite this compromise,
it remains to be seen whether some nations will permit their citizens to exercise
the waiver. The real test will be whether a judgment obtained in a suit initiated
by a waiver will be enforced by the courts of a foreign defendant's home
country.
As the controversy over the proposed amendment to the Federal Rules
demonstrates, the Convention, albeit a substantial step forward, did not solve
all of the problems in transnational service of process. Much of the difficulty
has centered on the U.S. preference for service by mail, a method that has the
merits of simplicity and minimal expense.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including all proposed amendments
adopted by Congress effective December 1, 1993); see also Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401, 540-43 (1992) (standing committee proposed Rule 4(d)).
5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, Agenda E-19, Rules n.2 (Sept. 1992).
6. See Diplomatic Note from the British Embassy to the United States Department of State (Feb.
20, 1991) (unpublished record of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States) (on file with author); Diplomatic Note from the Irish Embassy
to the United States Department of State (unpublished record of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States) (on file with author); see also
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, supra note 4, at 521 (commenting on
development of proposed Rule 4(d)); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO RULE 4(D) (Service of
Process on individuals in Foreign states) AND TO RULE 26(A)(5) (Extraterritorial discovery) 1-4 (1992).
7. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d); see also Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms,
supra note 4, at 414-16 (standing committee notes on Rule 4(d)).
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Part of the problem is the mystique that for so many years has been a
feature of service of process in both transnational and domestic litigation. A
hard-headed reality in this area has yet to be fully recognized. Whether service
of process actually confers jurisdiction in the sense that it authorizes the court
to adjudicate a dispute is a murky concept in U.S. law.8 Nevertheless, it is clear
that an important function of service of process is to give notice.' That task
can be performed efficiently and inexpensively through the use of postal
channels; thus, efforts to simplify service of process through the mails deserve
encouragement. That has been a goal of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules and the Standing Committee over the years, but their rulemaking
authority, of course, does not directly extend to foreign nations.
II
INTERPRETATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF SERVICE UNDER THE
CONVENTION BY U.S. COURTS
The Convention has clarified some aspects of service by mail, but has left
others in a state of uncertainty. The treaty provides for service through the use
of Central Authorities" in each signatory country, but also deliberately does
not discourage the use of other, less formal methods. Article 10 of the
Convention reads:
Provided the state of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not
interfere with-
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to
persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the
judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destina-
tion,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service
of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other
competent persons of the State of destination."'
In Article 21, the Convention further provides that each contracting state is to
make known its "opposition to the use of methods of transmission pursuant to
Articles 8 and 10." In the absence of a formally expressed opposition, it is
generally assumed that a signatory nation accepts the methods listed in Article
10.12
8. See generally Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610-16 (1990) (discussing
whether service of process confers jurisdiction).
9. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981).
10. A "Central Authority" is designated by a state "to receive requests for service coming from
other contracting States .... Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
11. Id. art. 10.
12. See ADAIR DYER, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY Doc. No. 1,
CHECKLIST FOR THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N OF APRIL 1989 ON THE OPERATION OF
THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS ON THE SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD AND ON ThE TAKING OF
EVIDENCE ABROAD 12 cmt. 18 (March 1989); see also 1 BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE: CIVIL & COMMERCIAL §§ 4-1-5, 4-3-5, at 120-21, 148-49 (1990).
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The surface simplicity of the Convention in this aspect, however, has not
prevented uncertainty in the United States over the meaning of Article 10(a).
Judicial interpretation has focused on the fact that other articles of the
Convention refer to the "service" of judicial documents, but Article 10(a) uses
the language "freedom to send judicial documents."' 3  Some U.S. courts
addressing the use of the different language in the various articles have held
that the wording in Article 10(a) indicates that it- is not intended to apply to
service of process.14 Others have taken the position that the use of the word
"send" is not designed to make 10(a) different from 10(b) and 10(c) and that
Article 10 as a whole applies to service of process.15 Courts taking the latter
position, consequently, hold that when the nation in which the recipient resides
has not filed a formal objection to 10(a), service by mail is proper. 6
Most of the opinions in this country discussing Article 10(a) do so in the
context of resolving disputes over service on Japanese parties. Japan has filed
a formal opposition to Article 10(b) and (c) (use of consular and diplomatic
channels), but not to Article 10(a) (mail service). 7
The courts holding that service by registered mail upon a corporation in
Japan does not comply with the Hague Convention have relied upon two bases
for that determination. Some opinions cite the familiar canon of construction
that where the legislative body includes particular wording in one section of a
statute but omits that language in other parts of the same act, it is presumed
that the disparate inclusion or exclusion was intentional and with purpose.
8
Thus, the failure of Article 10(a) to use the words "service of process" indicates
that service by mail was not an approved method.'
Those courts also note that service of process by registered mail is not
permitted for domestic suits in Japan.2° Article 161 of the Japanese Code of
Civil Procedure does not permit a plaintiff to serve process by mailing a
complaint directly to the defendant.2' Service of process through the mail is
permissible only when "[t]he court clerk stamps the outside of the envelope
[containing the required documents] with a notice of special service [and] ...
[t]he mail-carrier acts as a special officer of the court by recording the proof of
delivery" and returning it to the court.22
13. See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1989); Ackermann v.
Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986).
14. See, e.g., Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173-74.
15. See, e.g., Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839.
16. Id.
17. See 1 RISTAU, supra note 12, at A-47.
18. See, e.g., Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173-74.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 123 F.R.D. 595,599 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Suzuki Motor
Co. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
21. Bankston, 123 F.R.D. at 598 (citing Masayuki Sakai & Lynn F. Pickard, Service of Process on
a Japanese Defendant to Commence a Foreign Lawsuit, YUASA & HARA PATENT NEWS, Summer 1978,
at 5-13 (English ed.)).
22. Robert W. Peterson, Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555,
577 (1985).
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Because of these restrictions on service of process by registered mail in
Japanese domestic suits, many courts and commentators have reasoned that it
is highly unlikely that Japan's failure to object to Article 10(a) was intended to
authorize mail service in that country for suits filed in the United States.3 For
example, in Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of America, the district judge found "it
implausible that Japan, which objected to the 'less intrusive' paragraphs (b) and
(c), and which does not permit service of process by registered mail in domestic
cases, would consent to the service of foreign process by mail."24
The reasoning used by the courts that have quashed service of process by
mail in Japan is weighty and not to be lightly disregarded, but a number of
equally thoughtful opinions have taken the view that such service is valid. In
those opinions, the courts construe the language of Article 10(a), specifically the
word "send," as permitting service of process by mail.25 In his commentary to
the Hague Convention, Bruno Ristau asserts that Article 10(a)'s use of the word
"send" in connection with judicial documents (in French, "d'adresser . . . des
actes judiciaries") includes "service of process."26 Conceding that the contrary
position raises questions that "are not insubstantial," he nevertheless concludes
that "[t]he use of different terms in the several paragraphs of Article 10 may
well be attributed to careless drafting.,
27
In preparing Article 10, it appears that the rapporteur tracked Article 6 of
the 1954 Convention (to which the United States is not a party). That treaty
provided:
The provisions of the preceding articles do not preclude:
23. Suzuki, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379; see Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of Volentieri & C., 688 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (W.D. Mo.
1988); Prost v. Honda Motor Co., 122 F.R.D. 215, 216 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co.,
111 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
See generally Fleming v. Yamaha Motor Co., 774 F. Supp. 992, 995 (W.D. Va. 1991); Raffa v. Nissan
Motor Co., 141 F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 131 F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla.
1990); McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Sheets v. Yamaha Motors
Corp., 657 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. La. 1987); Cooper v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16 (D. Me. 1987);
Reynolds v. Koh, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Ordmandy v. Lynn, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup.
Ct. 1984); E. Charles Routh, Litigation Between Japanese and American Parties, in CURRENT LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 190-91 (John Owen Haley ed., 1978).
24. Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citations
omitted).
25. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986). In that case, the court of
appeals reviewed the validity of service by a German litigant on an American defendant. The court
in Berlin had forwarded a summons and complaint to the German consulate in New York, which then
sent the documents by registered mail to the defendant at his residence in New York. The court of
appeals observed that the United States had not filed an opposition to Article 10(a), and so,
consequently, this country did not oppose service by mail. For additional source material, see
Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., 128 F.R.D. 638 (D.S.C. 1989); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co.,
680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 121 F.R.D. 32, 34-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Newport Components v. NEC Home Elec., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1541-42 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Lemme
v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194,
199-200 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1085-86 (E.D. Va. 1984);
Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors, 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1206 (D.D.C. 1984).
26. 1 RISTAU, supra note 12, § 4-3-5, at 148-49.
27. Id. at 149.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
1. The faculty to forward process directly by mail to interested parties
abroad;
2. The faculty of the interested parties to have service made directly through
competent serving officers (officers ministeriels) or officials of the country
of destination;
3. The faculty for each state to have service directed to persons abroad made
through its diplomatic or consular agents.2"
The parallels between that article and Article 10 of the 1964 Hague Convention
are apparent and lend strength to Ristau's conclusion that the variations in
language between subsections (a), (b), and (c) were not intended to be of
significance.
The context of Article 10(a) also suggests that "send" includes service of
process. The scope of the Hague Convention encompasses "service abroad of
judicial documents." It follows that the language in Article 10(a) providing for
the "freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels" would be
superfluous unless it applied to service of process.29 Moreover, "the reference
appears in the context of other alternatives to the use of the 'Central Authority'
created by the treaty. '
The interpretations of Article 10(a) by those participating in its drafting also
support the conclusion that "send" includes service of process. Philip Amram,
a member of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, said of the scope of the
Convention: "Optional techniques may be used, for example-(1) diplomatic
and consular channels (arts. 8 and 9)[, and] (2) unless the requested State
objects, direct service by mail or transmission to a process server for service (art.
10)."'" Moreover, a handbook prepared by the Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law in "close cooperation" with the
parties to the Convention states: "The majority of States do not oppose the
forwarding of judicial documents originating in other Contracting States directly
by mail to persons on their territory.
32
Finally, some courts have also concluded that service by mail is justified
based on policy reasons. These courts note that service of process by means of
registered mail is less intrusive than alternative means that might require official
government action within the boundaries of the local state. Moreover, service
by mail minimizes any imposition on local authorities.33
28. Hague Convention Relating to Civil Procedure, Mar. 1, 1954, 286 U.N.T.S. 265.
29. See, e.g., Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
30. Id.
31. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
32. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION
OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND
EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATIrERS 42 (2d ed. 1992). The handbook
further states that the Bankston line of cases "appear[s] to go against the understanding of the French
version of Article 10a of the 1965 Convention as it had existed throughout the entire history of the
predecessor conventions from 1894 through 1954." Id. at 45. See generally Committee on Fed. Courts
of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Service of Process Abroad: A Nuts and Bolts Guide, 122 F.R.D. 63 (1989).
33. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors, 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1206 (D.D.C. 1984) (quoting
F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1313 & n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Mr. Amram's comments and the Permanent Bureau's handbook are not
cited in the many opinions holding that Article 10(a) does not authorize service
of process, leaving open to question the adequacy of briefing in those cases. In
the instances where service on Japanese corporations was at issue, the
conflicting views on whether Japanese law authorized service by mail in its
domestic litigation often do not make clear that service by mail is permitted, but
only under the authority and direction'of the Japanese courts.
When the Special Commission of April 1989 on the Operation of the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
convened, one of the questions asked of participants was whether there had
been "court decisions in your country interpreting Article 10a," noting that
some U.S. courts had held that mail service was ineffective. In response, the
Japanese delegates issued the following statement on the part of their
government:
Japan has not declared that it objects to the sending of judicial documents, by postal
channels; directly to persons abroad. In this connection, Japan has made it clear that
no objection to the use of postal channels for sending judicial documents to persons
in Japan does not necessarily imply that the sending by such a method is considered
valid service in Japan; it merely indicates that Japan does not consider it as
infringement of its sovereign power.'
The "clarification" in the Japanese statement should not give comfort to U.S.
litigants who choose to forgo the Convention procedures in favor of the less
complex and inexpensive method of service by direct mail to Japan. The ease
of effecting service by mail will likely be outweighed by the difficulty in
enforcing such a judgment in Japan or anywhere else outside the United States.
Japan, like civil law countries, considers service of process to be an official
government act. As Professor Kojima stated during the symposium: "Service
is an official, public act in Japan,"35 and legal certainty is an important aspect.
Although it apparently does not consider mail service an infringement of its
sovereign power, Japan may nevertheless take the position that service upon a
person in that country by U.S. courts or litigants constitutes an exercise of
jurisdiction by the United States within the territory of Japan that is not
effective. It is therefore questionable whether Japan will recognize the validity
of a judgment in a suit where service was completed by mail.36
34. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL
COMM'N OF APRIL 1989 ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965
ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATTERS AND OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATTrERS 11 (August 1989). A team of commentators has said that, in Japan, failing personal service
by delivery, substitute service, or leaving documents, the court clerk may send a copy by registered mail
(effective whether addressee receives it or not). Chin Kim & Eliseo Z. Sisneros, Comparative Overview
of Service of Process: United States, Japan, and Attempts at International Unity, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 307 n.62 (1990) (citing T. Hattori & D. Henderson, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN
§ 7.01[4][d] (1985)).
35. Takeshi Kojima, Remarks at the Law and Contemporary Problems Symposium on Jan. 4, 1993.
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SERVICE OF PROCESS IN JAPAN 3 (June 1987).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The inconsistency of U.S. decisions applying Article 10(a) to Japanese
defendants is in large measure due to the failure of the Japanese government
either to formally object to Article 10(a) or to accept it without qualification.
Apparently, the Japanese delegates did not realize that Article 10(a) could be
in conflict with their domestic practice in serving process. It may be that,
because Japan utilizes service by mail only under the direction of a court
official, the delegates did not recognize the likelihood that it would be used
directly by U.S. litigants as the method of choice.
Had Japan objected to Article 10(a), as it objected to Article 10(b) and (c),
the uncertainty in case law likely would not have arisen because U.S. judges
would have honored the objection. Courts in this country have consistently
recognized Germany's unwillingness to permit service by mail as manifested by
its formal opposition to Article 10(a).37
Yoshio Ohara, a Professor of Law at Kobe University, agrees that Japan
"should have declared, or even now should declare, its objection to [Article
10(a)]."3 He concedes that it is not clear why Japan did not object and why
it abstained from the German proposal, made in 1964, to modify Article 10(a)
by requiring the destination state to expressly consent to service by mail.
Professor Ohara points out that Japan does not permit its citizens to serve
process by mail in foreign countries, unlike U.S. litigants who enjoy that
privilege under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1)(D). Because Japan has
not yet amended its own Code of Civil Procedure to permit service by mail in
foreign countries by its own citizens, reciprocity does not require that Japan
extend to foreigners a privilege it denies to its own people. However, one
would hope that instead of following Professor Ohara's suggestion, Japan would
adopt the more enlightened view and recognize service by mail as legitimate.
As noted earlier, foreign nations' sensibilities over service of process have
been recognized by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. The new Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides:
[I]f there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international
agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated
to give notice[, service may be made] ... (C) unless prohibited by the law of the
foreign country, by ... (ii) any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served ... ..
The new rule will not, in itself, resolve the problems of service by mail in Japan
because of the equivocal nature of the Japanese position. It thus leaves U.S.
courts to continue their struggle with the issue.
37. See, e.g., Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
38. Yoshio Ohara, Judicial Assistance to Be Afforded by Japan for Proceedings in the United States,
23 INT'L LAW. 10, 16 (1989).
39. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f)(2); see Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, supra
note 4, at 410 (standing committee proposed Rule 4(0).
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III
IMPAcT OF NEW FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4
The most frequent application of the new Rule 4 is likely to be in cases
where service of process occurs in a country that is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention. This situation.is illustrated by Umbenhauer v. Woog,4 where the
court gave a plaintiff the option to use mail or letters rogatory to serve a Swiss
resident.
Switzerland is not a signatory to the Convention and has forcefully objected
to service of process by mail within its borders. In an effort to forestall
continuing protests from the Swiss and other governments with similar views,
some years ago the State Department sought the assistance of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts. Responding to the State Department
request, the General Counsel of the Administrative Office sent a letter to the
clerks of the district courts notifying them that they should not attempt service
of process by mail in Switzerland and other designated countries.
In the Umbenhauer case, the clerk of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to send a summons and complaint
by registered mail to the individual defendant living in Switzerland. The district
court agreed with the clerk's action and dismissed the case. The court of
appeals concluded, however, that the clerk (and thus the Administrative Office
of the United States and the State Department as well) was bound by the terms
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1)(D),4" allowing service by mail in
foreign countries or, in the alternative, by subsection (e), authorizing service in
accordance with state procedures.
42
In its opinion approving an option for service by mail, the court of appeals
did not cite the Advisory Committee note to the then-current Rule 4 that
pointed out "[s]ervice of process beyond the territorial limits of the United
States may involve difficulties not encountered in the case of domestic
service., 43 The Committee explained that some countries would consider such
service of process offensive. The note further states that "one of the purposes
of subdivision (i) is to allow accommodation to the policies and procedures of
the foreign country."'  In addition, subparagraph (E) of paragraph 1 provides
that service may be made "as directed by order of the court." The Committee
note observes that subparagraph (E) "adds flexibility by permitting the court by
order to tailor the manner of service to fit the necessities of a particular case or
40. 969 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1992).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(D) (1988) (repealed 1993).
42. Umbenhauer, 969 F.2d at 31-34.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (advisory committee note to 1963 amendment).
44. Id. (emphasis omitted). Born and Westin ask the question: "Where would a U.S. Court derive
the power to forbid service authorized by Congress in Rule 4 on the grounds that the service violated
foreign law?" BORN & WESTIN, supra note 3, at 129.
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the peculiar requirements of the law of the country in which the service is to be
made."45
Despite its recognition of Swiss objections, the court of appeals apparently
believed it had no discretion to require the plaintiff to choose a method of
service that would not offend the Swiss government. The court, however, did
recognize that failure to use letters rogatory would likely make the judgment
unenforceable in Switzerland. The court's opinion acknowledged that the then-
proposed amendment to Rule 4, prohibiting service by a means violating the law
of the recipient's country, would have required a different result.
46
The Umbenhauer case demonstrates the need for comity, an admonition that
was not included in the text of the version of Rule 4 in place at the time. The
new Rule 4(f)(2)(C) gives specific recognition to that important consider-
ation. 47 Thus, although the current Rule 4 may not completely answer the
questions posed by the Japanese situation, it does seem to respect the
unwillingness of Switzerland and other nations to approve the use of mail
service.
IV
AVOIDANCE OF CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE SERVICE
In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,48 the Supreme Court
approved a state law determination that a corporate subsidiary was an effective
agent to receive service of process on behalf of its foreign parent. Hence,
because no transmission of judicial documents to a foreign country was required
to make service effective, the Convention was not implicated. Just how far the
Schlunk principle will extend remains to be seen.
An interesting related issue is posed by Melia v. Les Grands Chais de
France,49 where the defendant was a French corporation with its principal place
of business in that country. Although France is a signatory to the Convention,
the plaintiff sought to serve the defendant in several ways-none of them
through the Central Authority or by other methods permitted by the Conven-
tion.
The plaintiff relied on a Rhode Island statute providing that a foreign
corporation carrying on business within the state is presumed to consent to
service upon the Secretary of State. The statute provides that after service is
made upon the Secretary, "he or she shall immediately cause one of such copies
to be forwarded by registered mail, addressed to the corporation at its principal
office." 50
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (advisory committee note to 1963 amendment).
46. Umbenhauer, 969 F.2d at 32-33 (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (advisory committee note)); see
also Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, supra note 4, at 544 (standing
committee proposed Rule 4(f)).
47. Id.
48. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
49. 135 F.R.D. 28 (D.R.I. 1991).
50. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-108(b) (1992).
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The district court held that service was complete when the Secretary was
served, and, because the statute did not require the plaintiff to mail a copy
directly to the defendant in addition to that sent by the Secretary of State, the
Hague Convention did not apply.5" The court paraphrased Schlunk's holding
to be: "If the forum state requires transmission abroad to effect service, the
Convention applies; if, however, service can be effected without the transmission
"952abroad of documents, the Hague Convention does not apply ....
Melia appears to be an overly expansive reading of Schlunk. Article 15 of
the Convention provides that a judgment may not be entered unless a foreign
defendant receives adequate and timely notice of the lawsuit. One of the stated
objectives of the Convention is "to create appropriate means to ensure that
judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the
notice of the addressee in sufficient time.
' 53
In asserting that the act of service is complete when the Secretary of State
receives the documents, Melia seems to have approved to some extent a form
of service that troubled the Hague Conference-notification au parquet. That
procedure permits deposit of documents with a local official who is generally
expected to transmit them abroad. However, the time for filing an answer
begins to run on the day the official receives the documents and, allegedly, no
sanction exists for failure to transmit them.54
Philip Amram was concerned with the due process aspects of notification au
parquet. He cautioned: "Frequently, both the time for moving to open
judgment and to appeal will have long since expired before the defendant finds
out about the judgment." 55 Mr. Amram noted that such inequitable results are
avoided in U.S. law by due process restrictions on long-arm statutes that require
"the form and content of the defendant's notice [to provide] knowledge of the
proceedings and the opportunity to defend himself in due time. ' 56 Mr. Amram
pointed out that if in a particular state "service on the appropriate official need
be accompanied only by a minimum effort to notify the defendant and if a
default judgment may be entered in as short a period as thirty or sixty days, the
convention will require greater protection of the defendant who lives outside the
United States in a convention country.,
57
Not all district courts have followed the same path as Melia. In McClenon
v. Nissan Motor Corp.,58 for example, the court held that because the plaintiff
was required by the substituted service statute to send a copy of the summons
51. In the only Rhode Island case addressing the scope of section 7-1.1-108, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that the section did not authorize such service outside of the Hague Convention
procedures. Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130, 131-32 (R.I. 1985). The Melia court
found the scope of the Hague Convention was a matter of federal law and refused to follow Cipolla.
135 F.R.D. at 30-31.
52. Melia, 135 F.R.D. at 30.
53. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 702-03.
54. See id. at 703-04.
55. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 15.
58. 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
and complaint to both the Secretary of State and the defendant, the process
involved transmission of documents abroad and the Convention was applica-
ble.59
Schlunk did allow avoidance of the Hague Convention, but at least its
decision rested on a realistic and pragmatic concept of notice. Service on the
subsidiary undoubtedly would get to the attention of the parent. After all, their
activities were closely related. Melia, however, fails to consider the difference
between a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant and a state official who has
no actual relationship with the defendant and whose capacity to accept service
is in fact a legal fiction. Melia, one may hope, will remain an aberration.
V
TRANSLATION REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICE UNDER THE CONVENTION
Translation of judicial documents into the language of the destination
country is another vexing problem that arises in the context of international
service of process. Professor Ohara points out that failure to furnish translated
copies of judicial documents imposes a hardship on Japanese citizens.' One
U.S. court cavalierly dismissed that objection because the personnel of the
Japanese corporate defendant were fluent in English.61 However, Professor
Ohara points out that in a suit to enforce a U.S. judgment in Japan, a Japanese
defendant's lack of understanding of English as an element of proper notice
might be an issue. As he points out, in Julen v. Larson,62 a California appeals
court declined to enforce a Swiss judgment based on process written in German,
which the U.S. defendant did not understand.
The United States has acknowledged that the Convention is not clear about
the necessity for translations and that further examination of the issue is
desirable. Commenting that "there will be few instances where all of the
documents" must be translated, a suggestion has been made that only a
summary need be translated.63
As evidence of its cooperative attitude, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules might well consider whether, in all cases of service abroad, a summary
should be included in the language of the country where process is to be served.
That is not as radical a proposal as it might at first appear; bilingual notices are
already being used in this country in some instances. Rules of procedure in
some states, including Pennsylvania, require that warnings to the defendant in
59. See also Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Co., 131 F.R.D. 206,207 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (requiring plaintiff
to send copy of complaint to defendant by registered mail); cf. Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., 128
F.R.D. 638 (D.S.C. 1989) (holding that service on Secretary of State would be valid since Article 10(a)
allows service by mail). This matter is also discussed by the Committee on Fed. Courts of the N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n, supra note 32, at 73-74.
60. Ohara, supra note 38, at 16-17.
61. Shoie Kako v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
62. 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
63. PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4 ACrES ET
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZItME SESSION, 6 AU 25 OCTOBRE 1980, 362-63 (1983).
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a civil suit be in Spanish as well as English. 4 Requiring a plaintiff to provide
a translated summary of judicial documents is hardly an unreasonable burden
in transnational litigation. Such a provision would demonstrate a recognition
that emphasis on international cooperation rather than on parochial concerns
can do much to aid transnational litigation.
VI
CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention has greatly improved the means for serving process
in transnational litigation. Nevertheless, even though the Convention
established more relaxed rules, the signatories to the Convention have yet to
universally accept the more flexible methods of service that are allowed in the
United States.
The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent a step
forward for the creation of an easier and more efficient method of service of
process in transnational litigation, but they are effective only to the extent that
the country of receipt has not objected to the articles of the Convention that
allow for mail service. For real progress, the signatories to the Convention must
accept service by mail as appropriate in transnational litigation. That result may
be some time in coming, however.
Closer to home, U.S. courts can aid in the establishment of more flexible
procedures for service of process in transnational litigation by coming to a
consensus on interpretations of the Hague Convention. As it now stands, courts
are divided on whether service by mail is proper under the Convention.
Because of some disparity in the language of Article 10(a), which only mentions
the "freedom to send judicial documents" and does not explicitly refer to
"service of process," some courts have concluded that service by mail is not
proper. However, the decisions opposing that position, as well as the comments
made by the drafters of the Convention, present a stronger case for the
proposition that service by mail is acceptable under the Convention.
Even if uniformity among the courts should prevail, U.S. litigants still face
the prospect of securing an unenforceable judgment in instances where a
signatory has objected to service by mail. As transnational litigation becomes
more common, as it surely will, one would hope that more countries will see the
light and consent to more flexible methods of service.
64. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1018.1 (setting out a required notice to defendant of the nature of the suit
and necessity to consult a lawyer). Subsection (d) provides "[a] court may by local rule require the
notice to be repeated in one or more designated languages other than English." Pursuant to that
provision, Rule 1018.1(B) of the local Philadelphia Civil Rules provides that "[t]he notice required shall
also be given in Spanish." Similarly, the model summons in App. XI-A to the New Jersey Court Rules,
which corresponds with the New Jersey Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4:4-2, states certain warnings in
Spanish.

